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SUMMARY
We propose a tool to identify crashes caused by filed exploits from benign crashes, and
cluster them based on the exploited vulnerabilities to prioritize crashes from a security point
of view. The tool extracts features from crash reports and decides whether a crash caused
by malicious behavior or not. In the case of malicious behavior, it identifies the attack
type that generates the crash report; we are focusing on four attack types which are Heap
exploitation, Shellcode injection, Format String attack, and Return Oriented Programming.




Although softwares go into severl steps to ensure its overall reliability and dependability,
a bug can be existed after production and crash reporting systems play an important role
in identifying and debugging crashes in software systems[1]. Crash reporting systems are
common these days in most widely deployed software systems [1]. When a fault happens
in a process, the system terminates the process and generates a detailed problem report.
Vendors collects such reports automatically and classifies them to minimize programmer
effort [2]. Crashes generated because of a fault in which it can be benign casued by, not
limited to but including, incorrect code or improper interaction with third party applications
[1] or malicious. Classifing and prioritizing crashes should be based on the level of risk of
the bugs in such a way that a crach generated becasue of a bug that is targeted by attackers
is much more important to be fixed than a crash generated by benign reasons, hence, the
reliability and dependability of the system increased. Crash reporting files contain valuable
information that can be used to identify not only the root cause of a crash but as well
whether it is benign or malicious.
We propose a tool that can automatically identify crashes generated by attackers from
benign ones, and then cluster the attacker-driven crashes based on the root cause. An
malicious crash can be identified as one or more of the most popular and widely found
on crashes caused by attacks which are heap exploitation, Retuned-Object Programming
attacks, shellcode injection, and format string attack. The tool is composed of feature
extraction, classification, and clustering phases in which the first phase extracts features for
machine learning models that used by the tool, the second phase classifies crashes based





In this chapter, we present the overall design of the system, and further, we discuss the
features that are used by the classification and clustering phases. The system first ana-
lyzes crash reports and extract features from them for both the classification and clustering
phases. Second, the data is fed to the classification classifiers to identify whether a crash re-
port is benign or malicious. We identify a crash report as malicious if it has one or more of
the following threats: heap exploitation, Retuned-Object Programming attacks, shellcode
injection, and format string attack. We are focusing on these attacks as they are the most
common attacks. We identify crash reports as benign if the results from all the four clas-
sifiers are negative, zero. Third, compose the clustering dataset from the clustering feature
set which extracted during the feature extraction phase and based on the results from the
classification process. Finally, we feed the composed dataset to the clustering algorithm to
cluster the crash reports based on the exploited vulnerabilities. Figure 2.1 shows the overall
architecture.
Figure 2.1: System architecture. It classifies potential malicious crash reports caused by
four attack types, and cluster them based on the exploited vulnerabilities.
2
2.1 Classification Phase
During the classification phase, the crash is labeled either benign or malicious. A crash re-
port can have one or more of the threats we examined the crash reports against them. There
are four different classifiers: (1) Heap classifier which detects if a crash report caused by
heap exploitation, (2) ROP classifier which detects whether the ROP attack exists on a
crash report, (3) Shellcode classifier which recognizes when a crash report has a shellcode
injection, and (4) Format String (Fmtstr) which identifies if a program is vulnerable to for-
mat string attacks or not. All the classifiers are binary-based classifiers in which each core
labeled as either 1 or 0, where one means that the attack type that the classifier assigned
for is found on the crash report and 0 indicates it not found. During the feature extraction
phase, a set of features are extracted to be used by Heap, ROP, Shellcode and Fmtstr classi-
fiers. In this section, we present a clear overview of the feature set of each classifier and the
purpose behind choosing them. We first discuss a set of features that are used by more than
one classifier which we named them general features. General features are the features that
have general information regarding the overall of the crash report and are not for a specific
attack.
2.1.1 General Features
We believe that general features provide a pattern for every attack. Primarily, when a crash
happens in the middle of the exploitation payload.
Stack Pointer Register Validation
The Stack Pointer register indicates the location of the last element used on the stack.
We validate the value stored on the Stack Pointer register on a crash report by examining
whether the value belongs to the Stack memory region or not. The adversary can use Stack
pivot technique to control the victim program. The adversary can launch the stack pivoting
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by placing the payload into another memory region and manipulating the stack pointer to
point to that region. After lunching Stack pivoting technique, the adversary moved the
control from the actual Stack to fake Stack; thus, the Stack Pointer Register is corrupted.
Validating Stack Pointer register helps in distinguishing ROP attack that uses Stack Pivoting
method.
Stack Base Pointer Register Validation
Stack Base Pointer register points to the top of the stack when the function is first called.
After the function is executed, it points to the base of the Stack. On Stack-based buffer
overflow, the Stack Base Pointer register is most likely to be overwritten. Therefore, vali-
dating the Stack Base Pointer register is a good indicator of malicious behavior. We validate
Stack Base Pointer register by first checking whether the value stored on the register be-
longs to the Stack memory region or not. When a function is called, a function prologue
is executed in which the current value of Stack Base Pointer register pushed into the Stack
to save its current value. Then, the value of Stack Pointer register is moved to Stack Base
Pointer register. Finally, a space for the frame is assigned by subtracting n words from
Stack Pointer register. Therefore, iterating over the values stored on the Stack Base Pointer
register gives us the previous Stack frames base which further points to the Stack. Hence,
we keep checking whether the values inside the pointers are pointing to the Stack til we
reach zero as the entry point usually sets up the initial value of the Stack Base Pointer Reg-
ister to zero. Reaching zero indicates that we reach the end of the call Stack which means
that the register is probably not corrupted. Figure 2.2 clarifies the process of validating
Stack Base Pointer Register.
Instruction Pointer Register Validation
Instruction Pointer register points to the next Instruction to be executed. In the case of
Shellcode injection, the Instruction Pointer register is corrupted in which it points another
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(a) A Simple C Program
(b) A call stack
Figure 2.2: Validating EBP
memory region where the Shellcode injected. On Heap-based vulnerabilities, the adversary
can use Shellcode injection, ROP chain, or both Shellcode injection and ROP to launch a
complete desired exploitation. Therefore, we believe that including the validation of the
Instruction Pointer register as a feature for Shellcode and Heap classifiers is a significant
indicator of malicious crashes.
Signal
A program crash has a specific crash signal in which it tells the reason behind the crash
- a Unix core signal shown in Table 2.1 [3], where the first column is the number of the
crash signal and the second column is the signal name. Usually, crash reports crashed with
a signal number 11. However, when an injected shellcode payload is inaccurate. Then,
when the Instruction Pointer Register wants to jump to the next instruction that is invalid
instruction, the program crashes and leave behind a crash report with signal number 4 which
indicates that the next Instruction to be executed is invalid. Additionally, it is not likely for
a crash report that has signal number 8 to be caused by any of the threats we are focusing
on them. Therefore, we believe that having the crash signal as a feature for Shellcode and
5
Table 2.1: Core Signals on x86 Architectures
Core Signal Number Comment




7 Bus error -Bad memory access
8 Floating-point exception
11 Segmentation Fault - Invalid memory reference
24 CPU time limit exceeded
25 File size limit exceeded
31 Bad system call
ROP classifiers gives us a clue on whether a crash report is malicious or not.
2.1.2 Heap Classifier
In addition to the Instruction Pointer Register Validation from general features, we have
introduced a set of features for the Heap Classifier. The features is added in which it gives
the classifier much information regarding the possibility of heap exploitation existing. To
extract the features for Heap classifier, we first have to reconstruct the heap memory area
by calculating the address of the main arena using the main arena offset that is searched
for on the debug version of Libc. After locating the main arena address, we then locate
the top chunk and the Heap start and end addresses. The feature set for Heap Classifier
summarized in Table 2.2.
Number of Violation Found on Top Chunk
We validate the top chunk on two aspects. First, we verify whether the heap region is valid
in which it is not executable and have correct boundaries. Second, we validate the top
chunk address by inspecting whether the top chunk size equals to the maximum Heap size
which usually assigned to 0x21000.
MaxTopChunkSize = HeapEndAddress−HeapStartAddress (2.1)
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Table 2.2: Summary of the feature set for each classifier
Classifier Features
Heap Classifier
Is Instruction Pointer Register Corrupted?
Number of Violation Found on Top Chunk
Number of Invalid Pointers
Number of Chunks with Invalid in use bit
Number of Chunks with Invalid prev size
Number of Misaligned Chunks
Number of Chunks on Fast Bin with Invalid size
Shellcode Classifier
Signal
Is Instruction Pointer Register Corrupted
Number of Jump Instruction
Number of System Call Instruction
Number of Call Instruction
Number of Move Instruction
Number of Xor Instruction
Number of Nop Instruction
Fmtstr Classifier
Is Stack Base Pointer Register Corrupted?













Number of Format String Symbols




Is Stack Pointer Register Corrupted?
Is Stack Base Pointer Register Corrupted?
Number of Unexpected Instruction Pointers On Stack
Number of Gadgets on Data
Number of Code Blocks
Number of Heap Chunks Invalid Pointers
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Third, we validate the top chunk’s in use bit which it has to be not set because the top
chunk’s previous chunk should be allocated, malloc’ed. We believe that any violation on
the top chunk’s in use bit and size as well as its position is a sign of malicious activities.
Number of Invalid Pointers
It is crucial that we keep track on freed chunks pointers because the adversary can use
the opportunity to manipulate the forward pointer, FD, or/and backward pointer, BK. FD
pointers exist on freed chunks that kept on bins that maintain chunks with either single and
doubly linked list. BK pointers exist only on the bins that maintain chunks with a doubly
linked list. The malloc implementation uses these pointers to keep track of freed chunks.
The adversary can manipulate the pointers to control program execution. Therefore, in-
cluding the number of invalid freed chunks pointers is an essential indicator of malicious
behaviors.
Number of Chunks with Invalid in use bit
We verify whether the in use bit of a chunk sets correctly or not. We investigate all chunks
including freed and allocated chunks. The adversary can change the in use bit during
forged chunk creation process as well as overwriting another chunk. Consequently, count-
ing the number of the chunks with invalid in use bit adds a piece of evidence whether the
crash report is malicious.
Number of Chunks with Invalid prev size
In malloc implementation, when a chunk is freed, the chunk placed after it set the prev size
field to the size of the freed chunk. The prev size field is used only by the implementation
when the previous chunk is freed. Therefore, when a chunk is allocated, the chunk after has
to have zero on the prev size field. It is common that the adversary manipulates previous
size field of a chunk stored. Therefore, counting the number of chunks that have invalid
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prev size helps indicates whether a crash report is malicious.
Number of Misaligned Chunks
We further validate whether a chunk is misaligned with other chunks including top chunk
or whether the chunk lies off Heap region’s boundaries. Ideally, chunks do not overlap
with each other or lie out of its region, Heap; however, it is obtainable by the adversary
to mistakenly overwrite a chunk size with an incorrect size which results on such signs.
Therefore, the Number of misaligned chunks feature is a remarkable indicator of whether
heap exploitation exists.
Number of Chunks Located on Fastbin with Invalid Size
All chunks stored on one fastbin, have a fixed size. We validate whether the chunk size
equals to the expected chunk size for a fastbin or not. Therefore, counting the number of
chunks located on fastbin and having a wrong size is an indicator of unauthorized activities.
2.1.3 Shellcode Classifier
In addition to Instruction Pointer register validation from the general features, we feed the
classifier with the following features.
Number of Jump, System Call, Call, Move, Xor and Nop Instructions
We scan writable and executable memory regions for any possible shellcode. A disassem-
bler tool would disassemble any bytes to opcode even if they are not actual opcodes. There-
fore, instead of counting the instructions found on writable, executable memory regions,
we count the frequency of most commonly used instructions. We count the frequency of
jump, system call, call, move, xor, and nop instructions. We believe that in order for the
adversary to control program execution, the adversary requires at least one of the following
instructions: jump, system call, call, move and xor. The adversary would require to clear
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the registers for the exploit to work. Hence, the adversary would want to use xor. Similarly,
it is required to execute fully functional shellcode to use jump and move instructions. Ad-
ditionally, in order for the adversary to invoke an Operating System function, the adversary
requires to use system call instruction. We further count the frequency of nop instruction
as attackers tend to use nop sled in order to have much reliable payload. As a result, we
believe that it is adequate to have the frequency of nop instruction because the higher the
number of nop instruction is the higher probability of having shellcode injection on the
crash report.
2.1.4 Fmtstr Classifier
The Fmtstr Classifier has a set of features that we believe are important to detect Format
String attacks. The Classifier has only the validation of Stack Base Pointer register from
general features as a feature because it is possible that the adversary overwrites the register.
Format String vulnerable Functions
We check whether Format String unsafe functions exist on the binary or not because it is
not possible to have format string attack when the functions do not exist. However, when
they exist, it is possible to have a Format String attack but not necessary. Therefore, it
is necessary that we feed the Classifier with the information about the existence of the
vulnerable functions because it gives us a clue whether the attack is possible or not.
Encoded Format String Payload
We are applying patterning match on all the writable memory regions including Heap, and
all the found payloads are encoded using one-hot encoding technique — one-hot encoding
is widely used on machine learning for encoding string features. We create one feature for
each possible symbol that can be used on format string payloads. For instance, the feature
% represents the exiting of the percentage sign symbol on writable memory regions. When
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Table 2.3: One-Hot Encoding for Format String Payload
Feature Range of Values
% 0 or 1
$ 0 or 1
n 0 or 1
h 0 or 1
u 0 or 1
d 0 or 1
o 0 or 1
p 0 or 1
s 0 or 1
f 0 or 1
x 0 or 1
c 0 or 1
% exits, the feature has a value of one and when it does not exist, it has a value of zero.
Encoding possible payload results in a total of 12 features for each symbol described on
Tabel 2.3.
Number of Symbols
It is not sufficient for the classifier to tell whether Fmtstr attack exists by knowing only the
symbols. Therefore, we include the number of symbols found in writable memory regions
as a feature. The number of symbols gives us a clue on whether format string possible.
Number of Format String Possible Payloads
As our tool is implemented to be used by any binary, we considered the case where the
binaries are storing files including images which is the case on FFmpeg. To avoid misclas-
sification with encoded files, we introduce a feature that counts the number of payloads on
writable memory regions. We believe that the number of possible payloads give us a clue
on whether the attack exists or not.
Minimum Gap
In addition to the number of Format String possible payloads, we introduce a feature that
specifies the minimum gap between all possible payloads. We first calculate the gaps be-
tween all payloads and then, take the minimum gap. Gap value indicates whether the
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exploit is feasible or not.
2.1.5 ROP Classifier
The ROP Classifier has the validation of Stack Pointer, and Stack Base Pointer register
features from the general features. Besides, it has a set of feature discussed in this section.
Number of Unexpected Instruction Pointer
It is practically complex to detect ROP chain because the ROP chain has the same structure
of regular program execution. Therefore, instead of looking for ROP chain, we are looking
for what characterized ROP chain which is Gadgets. Gadgets distinguish ROP attack from
other attacks, and a successful ROP chain contains at least one or more gadgets. Conse-
quently, we count the number of possible gadgets on call Stack. We scan byte by byte
in order to intercept misaligned pointers. A wrong assumption of the size of the payload
yields to have the Gadget pointer to be misaligned. For each pointer located on the area we
examined on the Stack, we check whether the pointer points to the ṫext section of the binary
or any library of the included libraries. We exclude functions addresses which can be used
by the program in case of call instructions, and we further exclude any return addresses.
We detect return addresses by examining whether the previous instruction which is located
just before the instruction that the possible return address points to, is a call instruction or
not. If previous instruction is call instruction, we assume that the pointer is a return address.
We consider the pointer to be a Gadget pointer by verifying whether a return instruction
exists on the instruction or the following instructions. Figure 2.3 describes the scenario in
which we consider pointers as a possible gadget.
Number of possible Gadgets on Data
When the Stack Pointer register is corrupted and pointing to a writable memory region, it is
a very high chance caused by Stack Pivoting technique. Therefore, we interduce a feature
12
Figure 2.3: Senario on Considering Gadgets
that counts the number of possible the gadgets on only writable memory regions and not on
the Stack. We expect that caused by benign reasons to not have pointers on data points to
an executable memory region. Therefore, we believe that having this feature is a significant
identification of the existing of Stack Pivoting.
Number of Code Blocks
We include the number of code blocks in which we count the number of code blocks found
on writable memory regions by detecting instructions that create code blocks such as Call
instruction. The registers are most likely to be corrupted in case of Shellcode injection;
therefore, it would yield to misclassifying a crash report has Shellcode injection as having
ROP attack. Therefore, we include the number of code blocks as a feature to reduce the
possible false positive. The false positive in this case is not imperfect because, in the end,
it is a malicious crash report; however, it is essential to be as precise as possible in order
to have a highly accurate clustering results on the clustering phase because the clustering
phase is mainly depending on the accuracy of the classification phase.
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Number of Heap Chunks Invalid Pointers
Similarly, we include the number of invalid pointers for heap chunks because Heap-based
control hijacking could manipulate the registers; thus, we include the number of manipu-
lated pointers as a feature in order to avoid the False positives of the misclassifying of crash
reports caused by Heap exploitation as caused by ROP.
2.1.6 Data Standardization
After constructing the dataset and before feeding the data to the Classifiers, we standardized
the data by using the standard score, z-score. We apply the z-score equation, shown in
Equation 2.1, to each data point in the dataset. The mean and the standard deviation of
each feature is calculated independently from each other. Important to note that we did not
measure the mean and the standard deviation on the entire dataset; training, validation and
testing sets. Instead, we calculated them based on the training set only because we aim to
generalize the models. If the mean and the standard deviation of the validation and test sets
are knowing to the classifiers during training step, then, we cannot say that the accuracy of
the classifier is accurate because in this case, the classifiers know the mean and the standard
deviation of the validation and testing set in advances. Therefore, we did not get the mean
and standard deviation of the validation and test sets, and we standardized them using the
mean and the standard deviation calculated from the training set in which we guarantee the






Where z is the z-score of a data point, x is the data point, µ is the mean, and σ is the
standard deviation.
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Table 2.4: Clustering Features
Feature Range of Values
Heap Start Offset Integer, ≥ 0, -1 when no payload found on Heap
Stack Start Offset Integer, ≥ 0, -1 when no payload found on Stack
Data Start Offset Integer, ≥ 0, -1 when there is payload found on
Heap or Stack, or no payload found on Data
2.2 Clustering Phase
Many crash reports are caused by the same bug [4]. Therefore, we cluster crash reports
based on the exploited vulnerabilities in order to reduce the time developers take to debug
them. We first cluster them to malicious and benign in which we prioritize them based on
the severity of the bug from a security perspective. We further cluster the malicious crashes
based on the exploited vulnerabilities. Clustering malicious crashes is not a simple task as
in most malicious crashes; registers are manipulated and corrupted purposely. As a result, it
is useless to cluster the crashes based on call stack. For instance, in case of stack pivot, the
Stack Pointer register is no longer pointing to the actual Stack memory; instead, it points
to another memory region. Moreover, in Stack buffer overflow vulnerabilities, Stack Base
Pointer register is overwritten which makes it infeasible to get the call stack. Therefore, it
is hard to identify the root cause based on the call stack because each crash report can have
a different call stack based on the exploits. Further, clustering crash reports based on the
Instruction Pointer register is insufficient because when the adversary controls the program
execution, the register can be pointing to another memory region. The ineffectiveness of
these methods proved in [5]. Moreover, it is not sufficient to cluster crash reports based
on signatures taken from exploits because different attackers can exploit a bug differently.
Therefore, we cluster the crashes based on the offset of the exploit.
During the feature extraction phase, we still do not know whether a crash report is mali-
cious or benign and which attacks existed within the malicious crash reports. Additionally,
a multi-stage exploit involves more than one attack type and exist in different memory re-
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gions. As a result, we are collecting offsets for all the possible exploitation payloads on
all the memory regions. Then, we confirm which attack is existed by feeding the data to
the Classifiers from Classification phase. In other words, the proper offsets will be selected
based on the results from the Classification phase. For instance, for an exploit placed on
Heap, the smallest offset considered the start offset of the payload. We calculate the offset
differently for exploits exists on the Stack. As the memory growth towards lower memory
addresses on the Stack and the environment variables are placed on top of the stack, we set
the Stack base after the environment variables in order to have a more stable offset. The
offset for any exploit exists on the stack are calculated by subtracting the payload start ad-
dress from stable Stack base. Three possible memory regions can hold exploitation: Heap,
Stack, and Data. We only consider the offset for exploit found on Data, if there is no offset
found on Heap or Stack. Using the mentioned details the tool automatically constructs the
data to feed to the clustering algorithm. The final clustering features summarized in Table
2.4.
Among all the existing clustering algorithm we selected Mean Shift algorithm because
it does not require specifying the number of clusters and we can control the result by one
parameter, the bandwidth [6]. Mean shift utilize the density of the points to generate a




We collected 14348 crash reports from the data that is used by CORONER [5]. We divided
our dataset into two sets: (1) a set that is used to train, validate and test the Classifiers hold-
ing 9218 crash reports, and (2) a set that is used to evaluate the entire system containing
5130 crash reports. We further split the first set into three sets: (1) a training set containing
60% of the 9218, (2) a validation set containing 20% of the 9218, and (3) a testing sets con-
taining 20% of the 9218. This policy is applied to all four classifiers. Table 3.1 described
the training and validation sets. The selection of the validation set is selected randomly;
however, we carefully selected the test set in which it contains crash reports from all pos-
sible categories: Benign, Heap, Shellcode, Fmtstr, and ROP. The Classifiers never see the
crash reports on the test set and 97.3% of the attacker-driven crash reports are generated
by binaries that their crash report never been seen by the Clssifiers. In addition to attacker-
driven crash reports, we included crash reports that are caused benignly selected randomly
from ffmpeg and php. In total, we have crash reports on the test set generated by six new
binaries preserved for the test set and ffmpeg and php. The test set is selected in which we
use a unique data, generated by unseen binaries, as well as use all the available data. We
Table 3.1: Summary of the training and validation sets. There are in total 7375 crash
reports. 100 crash reports from ffmpeg contains three attack types and 100 of them contains
two attack types, thus, the bottom right corner have an extra 300. The columns show the
number of crash reports for each binary per behavior whereas the raws show the number of
crash reports per malicious behavior.
Identified Behavior Ffmpeg PHP Students sum
Benign 1397 1075 0 2472
Heap 300 0 251 551
Shellcode 100 0 587 687
Fmtstr 0 200 1575 1775
ROP 200 0 1990 2190
sum 1997 1275 4403 7675
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Table 3.2: Summary of the test set. There are in total 1843 crash reports. The columns
show the number of crash reports for each binary per behavior whereas the raws show the
number of crash reports per malicious behavior.
Identified Behavior Ffmpeg PHP Students sum
Benign 269 238 0 507
Heap 50 0 236 286
Shellcode 0 0 365 365
Fmtstr 0 0 300 300
ROP 0 0 385 385
sum 319 238 1286 1843
also consider taking an equal portion of each of the four exploitation type — the test set
with their associated behavior highlighted in Table 3.2. Our experiments and evaluation of
the tool completed on a 3.1GHz dual-core Intel Core i5 running macOS 10.13.6.
3.1 Evaluation Metrics
In here we present an explanation of the metrics that we used to evaluate and assess different
Machine Learning Classifiers. We are using the accuracy score to evaluate how well the






Where is the True Positive is the number of positive instances on a set that the classifier
identified them as positive, and the True Negative is the number of negative instances that
the classifier correctly identified them as negative. The Recall score is the same as the true
positive rate and Precision is the True Positive rate over the number of instances that are










We further used F-measure to evaluate the Classification models and our clustering
algorithm. F-measure combines recall and Precision. The best score for F-measure is one
and the worst is zero.
F −measure = 2× recall × precision
recall + precision
(3.4)
Besides F-measure, we used two additional metrics to evaluate the clustering algo-
rithm, Homogeneity, and Silhouette coefficients. Homogeneity matrix is satisfied when all
instances on a cluster belong to the same class. Homogeneity matrix returns a score in
between zero and one where one is for perfectly homogeneous labeling and zero for non-
perfect labeling. Silhouette coefficients are to measure the consistency of an instance to its
cluster compared to the neighbor cluster. Computing Silhouette score depends the average
distance between a data point and other data points on the same cluster and the average





Where a for a data point is the average of intra-cluster distance, and b is the average of
nearest-cluster distance [7].
3.2 Selecting Machine Learning Algorithm
We performed experiments on 7375 crash reports, the training and validation sets, using
the scikit-learn library [8]. We used 10-fold cross-validation to assess the effectiveness of
several learning algorithms for our dataset. We compared a set of Machine Learning clas-
sifiers on the average score of cross-validation, the accuracy of the validation set, the true
positive rate of the validation set, F-measure, and the time it takes to build the mode. Based
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Table 3.3: Comparison of statistical Classifiers - Heap Classifier
Classifier Average CV Accuracy Validation Accuracy Validation TP Rate % F-measure Model Building Time (ms)
Logistic Regression 96.8% 97.22% 97% 0.97 0.021
Decision Tree Classifier 98.46% 98.58% 99% 0.99 0.049
Linear Discriminant Analysis 95.86% 95.59% 96% 0.96 0.018
k-nearest Neighbors 97.98% 97.9% 98% 0.98 0.043
Gaussian Naive Bayes 77.29% 76.95% 77% 0.82 0.030
Support Vector Machine 97.44% 97.97% 98% 0.98 0.043
Random Forest Classifier 98.47% 98.58% 99% 0.99 0.086
Table 3.4: Comparison of statistical Classifiers - Shellcode Classifier
Classifier Average CV Accuracy Validation Accuracy Validation TP Rate % F-measure Model Building Time (ms)
Logistic Regression 99.98% 100% 100% 1 0.019
Decision Tree Classifier 99.98% 100% 100% 1 0.035
Linear Discriminant Analysis 99.88% 99.86% 100% 1 0.021
k-nearest Neighbors 99.97% 100% 100% 1 0.048
Gaussian Naive Bayes 98.9% 98.98% 99% 0.99 0.027
Support Vector Machine 99.98% 100% 100% 1 0.037
Random Forest Classifier 100% 100% 100% 1 0.058
Table 3.5: Comparison of statistical Classifiers - Fmtstr Classifier
Classifier Average CV Accuracy Validation Accuracy Validation TP Rate % F-measure Model Building Time (ms)
Logistic Regression 98.83% 98.44% 98% 0.98 0.014
Decision Tree Classifier 99.07% 98.44% 98% 0.98 0.016
Linear Discriminant Analysis 96.93% 96.54% 97% 0.97 0.013
k-nearest Neighbors 98.94% 98.37% 98% 0.98 0.026
Gaussian Naive Bayes 99.07% 98.51% 99% 0.98 0.022
Support Vector Machine 99.03% 98.51% 99% 0.98 0.055
Random Forest Classifier 99.06% 98.44% 98% 0.98 0.051
Table 3.6: Comparison of statistical Classifiers - ROP Classifier
Classifier Average CV Accuracy Validation Accuracy Validation TP Rate % F-measure Model Building Time (ms)
Logistic Regression 95.50% 95.25% 95% 0.95 0.021
Decision Tree Classifier 99.78% 99.66% 100% 1 0.031
Linear Discriminant Analysis 95.88% 95.53% 96% 0.95 0.02
k-nearest Neighbors 99.69% 99.59% 100% 1 0.044
Gaussian Naive Bayes 80.71% 79.39% 79% 0.76 0.023
Support Vector Machine 99.19% 98.32% 99% 0.99 0.044
Random Forest Classifier 99.78% 99.67% 100% 1 0.099
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Table 3.7: Summary of the accuracy score of the training, validation, and testing sets for
all the Classifiers on the Classification phase.
Classifier Training Set Validation Set Test Set
F-measure Accuracy F-measure Accuracy F-measure Accuracy
Heap Classifier 0.98 99% 0.98 98% 0.98 98%
Shellcode Classifier 1 100% 1 100% 1 100%
Fmtstr Classifier 0.99 99% 0.99 99% 1 100%
ROP Classifier 1 100% 1 100% 1 100%
on the results presented in Table 2.3 to Table 2.6, we selected Random Forest algorithm
to build our four classifiers: Heap, Shellcode, Fmtstr, and ROP classifiers. Random Forest
algorithm gives the most accurate results among all of the algorithms for Heap and Shell-
code Classifiers. For ROP classifier Although Decision Tree algorithm results are close to
Random Forest Classifier, we selected Random Forest Classifier over Decision Tree Clas-
sifier, Decision Tree and Random Forest algorithms give the same accuracy which is the
best accuracy. Decision Tree algorithm provides the best accuracy for Fmtstr with 0.01 dif-
ference. For all the classifiers, we selected the Random Forest algorithm because decision
tree classifier can result in a complex tree that is incapable of generalizing the model which
in turn results in overfitting. Random Forest Classifier is a tree-based classifier. It generates
a collection of decision trees that fits the dataset on several sub-sets and utilizes averaging
to avoid overfitting.
3.3 Classifiers Evaluation
Our tool does not only identify malicious behaviors after they are launched; it also able
to identify the existence of any malicious behaviors. We validate our Classifiers on a val-
idation set that is used as a test set while assessing the algorithms using cross-validation.
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Table 3.8: Summary of the misclassified crash reports on the training, validation, and test-
ing sets.
Set Training Validation Test
Heap Classifier 1.46% 1.57% 1.63%
Shellcode Classifier 0% 0% 0%
Fmtstr Classifier 1.12% 0.86% 0.38%
ROP Classifier 0.23% 0.27% 0.05%
We further measure the accuracy of the classifiers on new, unseen data. Table 3.7 and
3.8 show the accuracy score and the misclassified rate respectively on training, validation,
and testing sets for all the Classifiers. Figure 3.1 shows the (Receiver Operating Character-
istics and the Area Under The Curve for each Classifier on the test sets.
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(a) Heap Classifier (b) Shellcode Classifier
(c) Fmtstr Classifier (d) ROP Classifier
Figure 3.1: ROC curves for Random Forest Classifiers - Heap, Shellcode, Fmtstr and ROP
Classifiers
3.3.1 Features Importance
To further assess our Classifiers, we measure the importance of the features for each clas-
sifier shown in Figure 3.2 to 3.5. To measure the significance of the features we used the
weights of the features that are calculated by Gini impurity which is the function that is
used to measure the quality of the Decision Tree split. Figure 3.6 shows the accuracy of
ROP Classifier currently with no feature removed and when removing one feature at a time.
We only removed the number of the code block, and the number of invalid chunks pointers
features to highlight who removing them from the feature set decrease the accuracy.
3.4 System Evaluation
We evaluated our tool on some of the crash reports used during Classification phase and
a new set of crash reports that have never been seen by the Classifiers. From the dataset
used during Classification phase, we selected ffmpeg and php crash reports generated while
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Figure 3.2: Featuers Importance - Shellcode Classifier
Figure 3.3: Featuers Importance - Fmtstr Classifier
Figure 3.4: Featuers Importance - ROP Classifier
Figure 3.5: Featuers Importance - Heap Classifier
24
Figure 3.6: ROP Classifier - when removing two features: one feature at a time.
Table 3.9: Summary of the clustering performance on ffmpeg and php crash reports.
Binary F-measure Homogeneity Silhouette Coefficient Accuracy
ffmpeg 0.90 1 0.992 83%
php 1 1 0.997 100%
exploiting reported vulnerabilities in order to simulate real-world exploit. We evaluate the
tool on the crash reports for ffmpeg targeting two vulnerabilities, CVE-2016-10190 and
CVE-2016-10191. We further evaluate the tool on the crash reports for php targeting also
two vulnerabilities, CVE-2015-8617 and CVE-2016-4071. In addition to evaluating the
clustering method on ffmpeg and php crash reports and evaluating the classifiers on the
validation and test set, we further evaluate the tool on unseen crash reports generated by
new binary, tachikoma in order to ensure the effectiveness of our tool. tachikoma is one of
the challenges on DEF CON CTF Final 2015.
ffmpeg crash reports: We run the completed tool on ffmpeg malicious crash reports in
order to evaluate the correctness of our clustering technique. The Classifiers are trained
on these crash reports and thus, have performed well with 100% accuracy and 0% mis-
classification. The tool clustered the crash reports into three clusters; one for crash reports
caused by exploiting cve-2016-10191, and the other two are for crash reports caused by ex-
ploiting cve-2016-10190. The reason behind clustering cve-2016-10190 crash reports into
two cluster is that the first cluster contains crash reports that crashed on trying to exploit
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Table 3.10: Summary of the clustering results for tachikoma crash reports.







the heap. However, the second cluster contains the already launched exploit. We evalu-
ate the clustering results using the F-measure and Silhouette Coefficient and Homogeneity
highlighted on Table 3.9
php crash reports: We yet evaluate the tool on php malicious crash reports to ensure the
accuracy of the clustering results. The Classifiers are also trained on these crash reports and
performed well with 100% accuracy and 0% misclassification — the crash reports clustered
the crash reports into two clusters: one for cve-2016-4071 and the other for cve-2015-
8617. We evaluate the clustering results using the F-measure and Silhouette Coefficient
and Homogeneity shown in Table 3.9.
tachikoma crash reports: We further assess the tool on tachikoma crash reports con-
taining 5130 crash reports. It is important to note that there were no crash reports from
tachikoma on the dataset used on Classification phase. We recognize that all the crash
reports caused by a binary programmed to be vulnerable and expected to be exploited.
Therefore, considering the ground truth for all the crash reports of tachikoma to be mali-
cious is a reliable assumption. Moreover, the functions that are vulnerable to Format String
attack do not exist which give us another piece of ground truth to evaluate Fmtstr Classi-
fier. Our tool classified all the crash reports as malicious; it classified 4986 as having Heap
exploitation and shellcode injection and 144 as having only Shellcode injection. There no
crash classified as having Format String attack which gives us 100% accuracy for Fmtstr




The performance of our tools relies on the performance of the feature extraction phase
which in turn depends upon the size of the crashed binary. We measure the performance of
the feature extraction phase when generating the dataset used on the Classification phase
which has an average time of 7.4 seconds and a median of 1.06 seconds. We further mea-
sure the performance of our tool on tachikoma crash reports. The average time for extract-
ing the features from tachikoma crash reports and classifying them is 0.022 millisecond,




In this work, we propose an effective method to identify whether crash reports caused
by failed exploits and cluster them based on the exploited vulnerabilities using Machine
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